Combining cryptography with EEG biometrics by Damaševičius, Robertas et al.
Research Article
Combining Cryptography with EEG Biometrics
Robertas DamaševiIius ,1 Rytis Maskeli0nas ,2
Egidijus KazanaviIius,2 andMarcinWofniak3
1Department of Software Engineering, Kaunas University of Technology, StudentJ 50-415, Kaunas, Lithuania
2Centre of Real Time Computer Systems, Kaunas University of Technology, K. Barsˇausko 59-A338, Kaunas, Lithuania
3Institute of Mathematics, Silesian University of Technology, Kaszubska 23, 44-100 Gliwice, Poland
Correspondence should be addressed to Robertas Damasˇevicˇius; robertas.damasevicius@ktu.lt
Received 22 December 2017; Revised 20 March 2018; Accepted 18 April 2018; Published 22 May 2018
Academic Editor: Ivan Volosyak
Copyright © 2018 Robertas Damasˇevicˇius et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
Cryptographic frameworks depend on key sharing for ensuring security of data. While the keys in cryptographic frameworks must
be correctly reproducible and not unequivocally connected to the identity of a user, in biometric frameworks this is different. Joining
cryptography techniqueswith biometrics can solve these issues.Wepresent a biometric authenticationmethod based on the discrete
logarithm problem and Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes, perform its security analysis, and demonstrate its security
characteristics. We evaluate a biometric cryptosystem using our own dataset of electroencephalography (EEG) data collected from
42 subjects. The experimental results show that the described biometric user authentication system is effective, achieving an Equal
Error Rate (ERR) of 0.024.
1. Introduction
Brain computer interface (BCI) is a highly growing field of
research with application in healthcare systems (from fall
prevention to neuronal rehabilitation) to educational, self-
regulation, production, marketing, and security as well as
games and entertainment. BCI aims to provide a channel of
communication that does not depend on the usual use of
peripheral nerves and muscles [1]. While the main intended
target application for BCI research is the development of
motor function independent prosthetic devices for impaired
patients, other applications of BCI, such as those for learning
[2], gaming [3, 4], or entertainment [5], raise the need for
ensuring the security and privacy of subjects using BCI sys-
tems. BCI systems are based onmeasurement of brain activity
on the surface (in case of noninvasive BCI) or inside (in case
of invasive BCI) of the human skull using electrodes. The
results of the measurement represent the sum of electrical
impulses emitted by a large number of brain’s neurons. Non-
invasive EEG signal is recorded by attaching the electrodes
to the head of a subject according to a given map such as
the 10–20 international system for the placement of EEG
electrodes.
Recently, BCI applications for biometrics have attracted
increased attention from the researchers. Biometrics provides
means for identifying people based on their physiological
characteristics [6]. Recently, there has been tremendous
growth in research on cryptography and biometric frame-
works because of incredible need for data security in
numerous applications, such as e-commerce, e-health, e-
government, e-voting, blockchain, law enforcement, digital
forensics, and homeland security. The goal is to verify the
identity of a subject using some characteristic of a subject.
In cryptographic frameworks, users use their passwords
or secret keys to protect their confidential data. However,
the use of passwords for identification has some well-
known drawbacks: textual passwords can be spied over
or cracked, and secret keys are too long and difficult to
memorize and can be stolen if stored somewhere. The down-
side of cryptography is that verification strategies are not
unequivocally connected to the person identity. Unlike cryp-
tography based authentication methods, biometrics using
behavioural and physiological characteristics such as iris,
fingerprints, electroencephalography (EEG) data, face, palm,
voice, and gait, is convenient and cannot be forgotten or
lost.
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The EEG-based subject identification is relatively new.
The advantages of using EEG for biometrics are its low expos-
ability (cannot be casually obtained or stolen by external
observers) and resistance to forced extraction because under-
stress brain activity changes [7]. They also can be used by
disabled patients or users missing some physical trait. Efforts
to develop biometric methods and systems based on the
EEG have targeted the development of subject condition
monitoring tools, for example, for detection of sleep apnea
[8], schizophrenia [9], or epilepsy [10]; the creation of BCI
systems to assist disabled people [11]; and marketing [12].
Analysts predict that the global EEG and electrocardiography
(ECG) biometrics market is to expand at a compound
annual growth rate of 12.37% during the period 2016–2020
[13].
The suitability of using EEG for privacy and security
applications can be attributed to morphological, anatomical,
and functional plasticity (behaviour-related lasting changes
in functional connections) traits [14], which contribute to dis-
criminability between subjects [15]. Several studies (mainly
from the fields of human physiology and genetics) have
confirmed that the spectral characteristics of the EEG alpha
waves (in the 8–12Hz range, which reflect relaxation and
disengagement) and the beta waves (in the 12–30Hz range,
related to action and concentration) of EEG show the
strongest heritability relationship [16].
The difficulties related to using EEG data are its instability
over time (the EEG permanence problem [17]). It is still
difficult to achieve high accuracy of EEG-based biometric
systems, which motivate researchers to explore new EEG
data analysismethods.However, the research community still
lacks knowledge on specific discriminant features of EEG
suable for biometry [18]. Up to now, the EEGpower spectrum
features were used to achieve relatively good classification
performance [18]. Several methods, which focus on the con-
cepts and methods adopted from the network science, such
as functional connectivity [19] and network organization
[20], have been proposed. Fuzzy commitment (FC) scheme
[21] can be used as a theoretical background for combining
cryptography and biometrics. In the FC scheme, a secret
key is linked to the reference biometric template, and the
difference vector is calculated in such way that the secret key
may be restored using the difference vector and the query
biometric template. Another approach is a fuzzy vault (FV)
based on polynomial reconstruction [22]. The FC and FV
schemes have been applied to biometrics before [23, 24].
Here we propose a secure EEG-based cryptographic au-
thentication scheme based on the commitment scheme
adopted from [25], provide a theoretical analysis of the secu-
rity characteristics of the proposed scheme, apply the scheme
to biometric systems to construct a biometric cryptosystem
using EEG signals, and evaluate it using our own dataset
recorded from 42 subjects. The rest of the paper is orga-
nized as follows. In Section 2 we present the state-of-the-art
overview of related work in EEG biometrics. We describe the
proposed method in Section 3. We state theorems regarding
the security characteristics of the cryptographic system in
Section 4. We describe the application of the method on
EEGdataset in Section 5.We present the experimental results
and their evaluation in Section 6. Finally, the conclusions are
given in Section 7.
2. State of the Art
Cognitive biometrics [26] uses brain signals as the source
of information for user identification (authentication). User
authentication is a process that ensures and confirms a user’s
identity in security systems. Using EEG signals for user
authentication can be effective with varying degrees of accu-
racy. For example, Fladby [27] used power spectral features of
alpha, beta low, beta high, and theta bands from just one EEG
channel of 12 subjects performing eight different tasks (from
simple relaxation to counting and reading) and a custom
feature based distance metric for subject discrimination,
achieving an EER of 21.42%. Palaniappan [28] used gamma
band of visually evoked potential (VEP) signals and the
neural network (NN) classifier to identify 20 individuals with
an average accuracy of 99.06%.
Liang et al. [29] extracted the AR features from 8 EEG
channels and used Support VectorMachine (SVM) to achieve
an accuracy of 45.52% to 54.96% for subject separation task
and an accuracy of 48.41% to 56.07% for subject identifica-
tion task. Marcel and Milla´n [30] implemented a Gaussian
mixture model (GMM) with maximum a posteriori (MAP)
estimation for 9 subjects, achieving a half total error rate
(HTER) of 6.6%.
Hema et al. [31] adopted feed forward NN for EEG using
Power Spectral Density (PSD) features from EEG beta waves
and reached an average accuracy of 94.4 to 97.5% on 6
subjects. He et al. [32] used a naı¨ve Bayes (NB) classifier with
autoregressive (AR) features and achieved a HTER of 6.7%
for 4 subjects.
Mu and Hu [33] used the back-propagation NN on data
derived from 6 channels of 3 subjects and achieved an 80.7%
to 86.7% accuracy. Brigham and Kumar [34] used linear
SVM classifier with the AR features and achieved accuracy
of 98.96% on 122 subjects tested. Hu [35] used the NN on
seven EEG signal features and obtained an 80% to 100% true
acceptance rate (TAR) and a 0 to 30% false acceptance rate
(FAR), while using data received from only 3 subjects.
Zu´quete et al. [36] demonstrated the stability of EEG
biometrics using visual stimulus to measure visual evoked
potentials (VEP) and a combination of one-class classifiers
(OCCs), including 𝑘-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) and Support
Vector Data Description (SVDD). Ashby et al. [37] used
linear SVM with AR and spectral characteristics of EEG
signals from 14 EEG channels and achieved 2.4% to 5.1%
false rejection rate (FRR) and 0.7% to 1.1% FAR for 5-
subject authentication. Shedeed [38] used the NN on features
obtained by fast Fourier transform (FFT) and wavelet packet
decomposition (WPD) from 4 channels, achieving a 66%
to 93% correct classification rate (CCR) using data from 3
subjects.
Chuang et al. [39] recorded single-channel EEG signals
when a subject performs a custom task (e.g., singing or mov-
ing finger). The authentication system analyses the similarity
between such brain data and training data to authenticate
subjects, reaching about 99% accuracy. Yeom et al. [40]
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used Gaussian kernel SVM on the signal difference and time
derivative features from 18 EEG channels and managed to
achieve the accuracy around 86% on 10 subjects.
Dan et al. [41] used the polynomial kernel SVM based
on the AR model parameters calculated on the EEG signal,
recorded a single EEG channel, and obtained an accuracy of
65% to 75% on 13 subjects.
Delpozo-Banos et al. [18] used the functional connectivity
patterns to represent effective features for improving EEG-
based biometric systems and classification using Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN) and achieved 97.5% accuracy
in eyes-closed (EC) and 96.26% in eyes-open (EO) resting
state conditions states when fusing PSD information from the
parietooccipital (centroparietal in EO) parts of the brain of 10
subjects.
Abo-Zahhad et al. [42] achieved more than 99% authen-
tication accuracy by using single-channel EEG signals from
10 and 15 subjects. Koike-Akino et al. [43] achieved 72%
accuracy for 25-subject identification fromEEGusing a single
800ms epoch and partial least-squares (PLS) dimensionality
reduction method applied before quadratic discriminant
analysis (QDA) classification.
Crobe et al. [44] obtained good results in the EEG gamma
(EER = 0.131 and AUC = 0.943 in EO condition; EER = 0.130
andAUC=0.933 in EC condition) and high beta (EER= 0.172
and AUC = 0.905 in EO condition; EER = 0.173 and AUC =
0.906 in EC condition) frequency bands.
Several studies presented the fusion of EEG with other
modalities to get a multimodal biometric system such as in
[45, 46]. Also see a survey of security and privacy challenges
in BCI applications in [47]. EEG-based authentication was
also considered as a part of smart driving systems to verify
the driver’s identity on demand [48]. However, using EEG
brainwaves for authentication might result in risks for the
privacy of users. For example, authors in [49] propose an
authentication system that verifies an individual EEG signal
when a subject performs a custom task. They also design an
attack model by impersonating the thoughts of subjects to
test the robustness of the authentication system.An adversary
also can attack the authentication system via synthetic EEG
signals, which are generated using a model based on the
historical EEG data from a subject [50].
3. Description of EEG Biometry Method
First, we provide definitions required for understating of the
biometric authentication method as given in [25].
Definition 1 (discrete logarithm). Let 𝐺 be a finite cyclic
group of order 𝑛. Let 𝑔 be a generator of 𝐺 and let ℎ ∈ 𝐺.
The discrete logarithm of ℎ to the base 𝑔, log𝑔ℎ, is the unique
integer 𝑢, 0 ≤ 𝑢 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, such that ℎ = 𝑔𝑢.
Definition 2 (discrete logarithm problem (DLP)). Given a
prime number 𝑝, a generator of 𝑔 of 𝑧∗𝑝 , and an elementℎ ∈ 𝑧∗𝑝 , find the integer 𝑢 such that ℎ = 𝑔𝑢 (mod𝑝).
Definition 3 (block code). A block code 𝐶(𝑛, 𝑘) over an
alphabet 𝐴∗ of 𝑤 symbols is a set of 𝑤𝑘 𝑛-vectors called
codewords. Associated with the code is an encoder {0, 1}𝑘 →
𝐶 which maps a message 𝑀, a 𝑘-tuple, to its associated
codeword.
Definition 4 (decoding function). Let 𝐶(𝑛, 𝑘) be a block code
set with 𝑤 = {0, 1}. A decoding function 𝑓𝑑 : {0, 1}𝑛 → 𝐶 ∪𝜀 maps a message 𝑐󸀠, a 𝑛-tuple, to correct codeword 𝑐, if 𝑐󸀠
and 𝑐 are sufficiently close according to appropriate metric.
Otherwise, it maps it to invalid codeword 𝜀.
Definition 5 (hamming distance). Given code set 𝐶(𝑛, 𝑘), the
Hamming distance between twowords 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑐𝑗 from the code
set 𝐶 is given by
𝐻(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗) = 1𝑛
𝑛∑
𝑟=1
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑐𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑟𝑗 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 . (1)
Definition 6 (error correction threshold). Error correction
threshold 𝑡𝜎 of the error-correcting code 𝐶(𝑛, 𝑘) is the largest
number of errors that can be corrected in the corrupted
codeword.
Definition 7 (statistical distance). Let 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 be two
random variables over the same space Ψ, and let 𝑃1 and 𝑃2
be their discrete probability distribution functions (PDFs).
Then, the statistical distance between 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 is as follows:
𝐷(𝑃1, 𝑃2) = ∑
𝜓∈Ψ
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨Pr (𝑋1 = 𝜓) − Pr (𝑋2 = 𝜓)󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 . (2)
Definition 8 (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes).
Let 𝛼 be a primitive element of Galois field GF(𝑞𝑚). For
any positive integer 𝑖, let 𝑚𝑖(𝑥) be the minimal polynomial
of 𝛼𝑖 over GF(𝑞𝑚). The generator polynomial of the BCH
code is defined as the least common multiple 𝑃(𝑥) =
lcm(𝑚1(𝑥), . . . , 𝑚𝑑−1(𝑥)).
The method, proposed by [25] and adopted here for
EEG biometry, consists of three procedures: (1) Setup, which
outputs a public key, (2)Commit, which takes as input and the
message and outputs commitment to be sent and the opening
value to be used formessage verification, and (3)Open, which
outputs true if verification succeeds or false otherwise. Three
actors participate: the sender Alice, the receiver Bob, and the
trusted third party Trent, who generated system parameters
and publishes it to Alice and Bob parties.
Let 𝑀 be the space of messages to commit to. The first
stage is Setup stage (see Algorithm 1), where Trent generates
and sends the keys to Alice and Bob. The second stage is
Commit stage, where Alice sends Bob its commitment for
a private message 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 and secretly holds an opening
value. The third stage is Open stage, where Alice sends Bob
the original message 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 along with the opening value,
so that Bob can verify that the message committed in the first
stage was indeed𝑚 ∈ 𝑀.
Definition 9 (commitment function). First we define the
commitment function 𝐹 : ({0, 1}𝑛 × {0, 1}𝑛) → ({0, 1}𝑛 ×
{0, 1}𝑛), defined as 𝐹(𝑐, 𝑥) = (𝜑, 𝛿); here 𝜑 = 𝐹𝑘(𝑚, 𝑥) =𝑔𝑚ℎ𝑥 (mod𝑝) and 𝛿 = 𝑥 − 𝑐 is the difference vector.
4 Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience
Input: Security parameter 𝑘.
(1) Generate randomly two prime numbers 𝑝 and 𝑞 of length 𝑘, such that 𝑝 = 1 (mod 𝑞)
(2) Choose randomly 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑝 − 1
(3) Compute 𝑔 = 𝑎(𝑝−𝑞)/2 ̸= 1 (mod𝑝)
(4) Choose randomly 1 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 𝑞 − 1
(5) Compute ℎ = 𝑔𝑏 ̸= 1 (mod𝑝)
Output: Parameters 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑔, ℎ
Algorithm 1: Initialization.
Definition 10 (commitment protocol). Commitment proto-
col 𝜋 is a scheme (for a message space𝑀) defined by a triple
(Setup,Commit,Open) such that
(a) (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑔, ℎ) ← Setup(⋅) generates the public commit-
ment key,
(b) for any 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀,(𝜑, 𝛿) ← Commit(𝑝,𝑞,𝑔,ℎ)(𝑚) is the
commitment/opening pair for𝑚,
(c) Open(𝑝,𝑞,𝑔,ℎ)(𝜑, 𝛿) → 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀∪{𝜀}, where 𝜀 is returned
if (𝜑, 𝛿) is not a valid commitment to any message.
To set the system parameters, Trent executes the following
procedure.
Setup Procedure
(1) Trent generates two prime numbers 𝑝 and 𝑞 such that
𝑝 = 1 (mod 𝑞).
(2) Trent finds a random generator 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑞 \ {1}, where𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑞 is a subgroup of the order 𝑞 in 𝑍∗𝑝.
(3) Trent computes an element ℎ = 𝑔𝑎 ∈ 𝑍∗𝑝 \ {1}, where𝑎 ∈ 𝑍𝑞 that is randomly chosen (ℎ is a generator element of𝐺𝑞).
(4) Trent sends the system parameters (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑔, ℎ) to Alice
and Bob.
Commit Procedure. To commit to a message 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑘 ⊆ 𝑍𝑞
in the message space𝑀𝑘 ⊂ {0, 1}𝑘, Alice encodes the message
into a codeword 𝑐 = 𝑔(𝑚) ∈ 𝐶 ⊆ {0, 1}𝑛, chooses a random
witness 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑛 ⊆ 𝑍𝑞 in the witness space 𝑋𝑛 ⊂ {0, 1}𝑛, and
then computes the commitment 𝐹(𝑐, 𝑥) = (𝑔𝑐ℎ𝑥, 𝑥 − 𝑐) =
(𝜑, 𝛿). The commitment is sent to Bob.
Open Procedure. To open the commitment (𝜑, 𝛿),Alice reveals
the witness 𝑥󸀠, which is in proximity to the original 𝑥 using
some metric distance (e.g., Hamming distance 𝐻(𝑥, 𝑥󸀠) ≤
𝑡𝜎). Using the difference vector 𝛿 the witness 𝑥󸀠 restores
the codeword 𝑓(𝑐󸀠) = 𝑓(𝑥󸀠 − 𝛿) = 𝑓((𝑥󸀠 − 𝑥) + 𝑐) and
then translates 𝑥󸀠󸀠 = 𝛿 + 𝑓(𝑐󸀠). Then Bob computes the
commitment 𝜑󸀠 = 𝐹𝑘(𝑓(𝑐󸀠), 𝑥󸀠󸀠) and verifies 𝜑󸀠 ?= 𝜑. In case
of failure, the commitment will not open using 𝑥󸀠. Otherwise,
the commitment is successfully opened and therefore the
secret message is𝑚 = 𝑚󸀠 = 𝑔−1(𝑓(𝑐󸀠)).
4. Security Properties and Analysis of
the Proposed Scheme
Let 𝜋 = (Setup,Commit,Open) be a commitment scheme,
and its security properties are (i) correctness, i.e., for every
message the commitment generated is valid, (ii) hiding,
where any attacker cannot learn information from the com-
mitment c about the message m with any advantage (perfect)
or with a negligible advantage, and (iii) binding, where
the message 𝑚 is uniquely bound to 𝑐 (perfect) or finding
another message with the same commitment has negligible
probability of success. In further analysis, we assume that
both the codeword 𝑐 and the witness 𝑥 are drawn randomly
from the finite set {0, 1}𝑛.
Definition 11 (correctness). A commitment protocol 𝜋
defined by the quadruplet (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑔, ℎ) is correct if, for all
messages𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, Open(𝑝,𝑞,𝑔,ℎ)(Commit(𝑝,𝑞,𝑔,ℎ)(𝑚)) = 𝑚.
The hiding property of the biometrical scheme describes
the resilience of the system against adversarial attempts
performed by impostor FakeBob to crack codeword 𝑐 or the
witness 𝑥. We allege that impostor FakeBob knows 𝐹 and can
access the commitment (𝜑, 𝛿).
The binding property represents the resistance of the
system against adversarial attempts by an impostor𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒𝐵𝑜𝑏∗
to guess a codeword 𝑐󸀠 with𝐻(𝑥, 𝑥󸀠) ≤ 𝑡𝜎, such that𝐹𝑘(𝑐, 𝑥) =𝐹𝑘(𝑐󸀠, 𝑥󸀠) = 𝜑, for some 𝑥, 𝑥󸀠 ∈ 𝑋.
For hiding and binding, we have two different adversaries
[51]:
(i) the unhider U, which plays the hiding game and
has two abstract procedures, one to choose a pair of
messages and another to guess which of the two
messages corresponds to a given commitment;
(ii) the binder B, which plays the binding game and has
only a procedure to output two different pairs (mes-
sage, opening value) that bind to the same commit-
ment.
A commitment protocol satisfies the hiding security property
if no adversary exists such that the probability of winning the
hiding game is (significantly) better than a blind guess [51]. If
this is true, the committer is guaranteed that no information
can be inferred by the commitment itself.
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Figure 1: EEG-based user identification/authentication framework.
Definition 12 (hiding). Let 𝜋 = (Setup,Commit,Open) be
a commitment protocol. Then we can define the hiding
properties for adversary U as Pr(𝐺𝐻𝜋 (𝑛) = 1) = 1/2.
Hiding Game. The hiding game 𝐺𝐻𝜋 runs as follows:
(1)The adversaryU is given the output of Setup procedure
and asked to choose two messages.
(2) The game randomly selects one of them and calls
Commit procedure to compute its commitment.
(3)The adversaryU is asked to guess which one of the two
messages the commitment corresponds to.
(4) The game outputs 1 if the guess of the adversary U is
correct.
A commitment protocol satisfies the binding security
property if no adversary exists such that the probability of
winning the binding game is higher thannegligible [51]. If this
is true, the receiver is guaranteed that the value committed
cannot be changed.
Definition 13 (binding). Let 𝜋 = (Setup,Commit,Open) be
a commitment protocol. Then one can define the binding
properties for each adversary B as Pr(𝐺𝐵𝜋(𝑛) = 1) = 0.
Binding Game. The binding game 𝐺𝐵𝜋 runs as follows:
(1)The adversary B is given the output of Setup procedure
and asked to bind two messages to the same commitment
value.
(2) The game outputs 1 if the two messages differ and the
commitment is valid for both themessages, that is, if both can
be verified by calling the Open procedure.
5. Application of the Method in
EEG-Based Biometric System
Here we present the biometric cryptosystem using the EEG
signals. Its implementation consists of the system initializa-
tion stage, the enrolment stage, and the authentication stage
as represented in Figure 1.
At the start of enrolment (see Algorithm 3), the user EEG
biometrics is acquired, and feature extraction is performed
using the EEG encoding algorithm, which outputs a 400-
bit EEG code. We use the EEG features derived from the
covariance matrix of EEG data from different EEG channels
in the 10–20 international system. The covariance matrix is
calculated from𝑁 channels in matrix as follows:
cov (𝑋) = 1𝑁
𝑁∑
𝑘=1
(𝑋𝑖,𝑘 − 𝑋𝑖) (𝑋𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑋𝑗) , (3)
where𝑋𝑖 holds the mean of all observations in the respective
EEG channels.
Next, we compute 𝑧-scores of the values in the covariance
matrix as follows:
𝑧𝑖,𝑗 = cov𝑖,𝑗 − (1/𝑁)∑
𝑁
𝑖=1 cov𝑖,𝑗
√∑𝑁𝑖=1 (cov𝑖,𝑗 − (1/𝑁)∑𝑁𝑖=1 cov𝑖,𝑗)2/ (𝑁 − 1)
; (4)
here cov𝑖,𝑗 is an element of the covariance matrix.
And perform normalization of 𝑧-score values of the
covariance matrix into the range [0, 1] as follows:
𝑍norm = 𝑍 −min (𝑍)max (𝑍) −min (𝑍) . (5)
Finally, we perform the binarization of data using threshold-
ing as follows:
𝑍bit (𝑖, 𝑗) = {{{
0, [𝑧𝑖,𝑗 < 0.5]
1, [𝑧𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 0.5] ;
(6)
here [⋅] is the Iverson bracket operator.
The result is a matrix that contains binary codeword of
400 bit length (obtained from 20× 20 covariancematrix).The
procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.
At the same time, a random cryptographic key 𝜅 ∈ {0, 1}𝑘
is prepared using a BCH(. . . , 𝑘) error correction encoded
function {0, 1}𝑘 → 𝐶. The result is a codeword 𝑐 ∈
BCH(. . . , 𝑘), which is combined with reference EEG code
(both have 400 bits of length).
Authentication phase is described in Algorithm 4. The
input EEG biometric 𝐵EEG is acquired from a person, result-
ing in a test EEG code 𝑥test. The test EEG code 𝑥test with
“exclusiveOR” denoted as⊕ extracts the codeword 󵱰𝑐 = (𝑥test⊕𝑥ref ) ⊕ 𝑐. Once it is extracted, the error correction decoded
function of BCH(. . . , 𝑘) is used to compute𝑓(󵱰𝑐) = 𝑓(𝑥test⊗𝛿).
Function𝑓(󵱰𝑐) is used to compute 𝑥󸀠test = 𝛿 ⊗ 𝑓(󵱰𝑐) = 𝑥ref (𝑐 ⊕𝑓(󵱰𝑐)). Nonvalid user will receive a codeword 𝑓(󵱰𝑐), such that
𝐻(𝑓(󵱰𝑐), 𝑐) > 𝑡𝜎. Then 𝜑󸀠 = 𝐹𝑘(𝑓(󵱰𝑐), 𝑥󸀠test) is computed and
matched against the stored 𝜑. If 𝜑󸀠 = 𝜑, then the sample 𝑥test
is accepted and the key 𝜅 is released. Otherwise, the identity
of a person is rejected.
The biometric scheme is summarized in Figure 2.
6. Experimental Results and Discussion
The implementation of the proposed scheme was made in
MATLAB 8.6.0.267246 (R2015b) on an Intel (R) Core (TM)
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Input: EEG channel signal values
(1) Calculate covariance matrix of EEG channels.
(2) Calculate 𝑧-scores of covariance matrix values.
(3) Normalize 𝑧-scores.
(4) Binarize 𝑧-scores into EEG code using zero value as threshold.
Output: EEG code 𝑥ref
Algorithm 2: Encoding.
Input: EEG biometric 𝐵EEG and cryptographic key 𝜅.
(1) Extract EEG code 𝑥ref from the EEG biometric data 𝐵EEG.
(2) Prepare the cryptographic key 𝜅 using BCH codes and obtain the codeword 𝑐.
(3) Compute the difference vector 𝛿 = 𝑥ref ⊕ 𝑐.
(4) Compute the commitment 𝜑 = 𝐹𝑘(𝑐, 𝑥ref ).
Output: (𝜑, 𝛿)
Algorithm 3: Enrolment.
Input: EEG biometric 𝐵EEG and fuzzy commitment (𝜑, 𝛿).
(1) Extract EEG code 𝑥test from EEG biometric 𝐵EEG.
(2) Compute the codeword 𝑓(󵱰𝑐) = 𝑓(𝑥test ⊗ 𝛿)
(3) Compute 𝑥󸀠test = 𝛿 ⊗ 𝑓(󵱰𝑐)
(4) Compute 𝜑󸀠 = 𝐹𝑘(𝑓(󵱰𝑐), 𝑥󸀠test)
(5) Check 𝜑󸀠 ?= 𝜑
Output: The user is authenticated or rejected.
Algorithm 4: Authentication.
Figure 2: Summary of the proposed EEG biometric scheme.
i5-4590 CPU (x64), running at 3.30GHz with 12GB of RAM
in Windows 10 Enterprise ver. 1709. For the performance
evaluation, we have used a dataset that consists of 65 EEG
samples from 42 different subjects, where each sample con-
sisted of 1000 signal values. The number of subjects satisfies
the condition of Lazar et al. [52], who stated that studies
using data collected from 20 or more participants are more
convincing than those performed with a lesser number of
participants. The EEG data we use in this study was collected
from 42 healthy adults. During data collection, the subjects
were instructed to lie still on a table and breathe normally.The
data was collected using a medical-grade EEG device from
Figure 3: Electrode locations for collection of EEG data.
the electrodes attached to subjects following the international
10–20 standard, which are depicted as circles in Figure 3.The
sampling rate was 256 s−1.
To perform code matching, we computed the Hamming
distance between two EEG codewords 𝐴 and 𝐵 as follows:
𝐻 = 1𝑛
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
(code (𝐴 𝑖) ⊕ code (𝐵𝑖)) ; (7)
here code(𝐴 𝑖) and code(𝐵𝑖) are the 𝑖th bit in EEG codes of
persons 𝐴 and 𝐵, respectively.
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Figure 4: Probability density functions Hamming distances be-
tween the same person and the different persons.
The intrapersonHamming distances have been computed
using EEG samples from the same subjects, while the inter-
person Hamming distances were computed using samples
from different subjects. We carried out 65 comparisons for
the same subjects and 118,335 comparisons between different
subjects. The result of the probability distribution function
(pdf) of the intraperson and interperson Hamming distances
is shown in Figure 4. One can see that up to 87 bits of error
(intersection of both graphs) are tolerated.
We use the following scenarios as suggested by Gui et al.
[53].
Scenario 1. The aim is to identify correctly each of the 42
subjects participating in the study. The training and testing
datasets include data from all 42 subjects and the classifica-
tion outcome belongs to one of 42 classes.
Scenario 2. The aim is to identify one subject versus all
other 41 subjects. There are only two classes: positive (target
subject) and negative (all other subjects).The training dataset
was combined using the data from all subjects and the
performing resampling so that both classes are balanced.
Evaluation. Following the suggestion of Jorgensen and Yu
[54], we use FalseAccept Rate (FAR), False Reject Rate (FRR),
and Equal Error Rate (EER) as key effectivenessmetrics of the
biometric system. FAR and FRR describe whether the system
correctly identifies the subject. ERR specifies the error rate
where the values of FAR and FRR become equal. The metrics
are calculated as follows:
FRR = |FR||AA| ,
FAR = |FA||IA| ;
(8)
here |FR| is the number of false rejections, that is, falsely
rejecting a verification attempt of a valid subject, |AA| is the
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Figure 5: Subject-wise correct classification rate.
number of authorized attempts, |FA| is the number of false
acceptances, i.e., falsely accepting the claim of an impostor
as a valid user, and |IA| is the number of attempts by an
impostor.
The performance is evaluated using the correct classifica-
tion rate (CCR) as follows:
CCR = |𝐶||𝑇| ; (9)
here |𝐶| is the number of correct classification decisions and
|𝑇| is the number of trials.
EER is defined as a unique point where FRR is equal to
FAR. A lower EER indicates a more accurate system.
EER = FAR (𝑇∗) = FRR (𝑇∗) ; (10)
here 𝑇∗ = argmin(|FAR(𝑇) − FRR(𝑇)|)
This ensures that the threshold found will satisfy the
equality condition between FRR and FAR as closely as
possible.
We have implemented both Scenarios 1 and 2 testing, as
subjected by Gui et al. [53]. In Scenario 1, CCR for each of the
subjects is presented in Figure 5.
Note that while the overall accuracy is quite good (mean
accuracy 0.895), for some of the subjects, it was quite low (e.g.,
only 0.446 for subject 15). This result may have been caused
by the infamous BCI illiteracy effect [55]. Nevertheless,
when inspecting the cumulative distribution plot of accuracy
distribution (see Figure 6), we can see that 50% of subjects
have accuracy higher than 0.93, while only 10% of subjects
have accuracy lower than 73%.
As accuracy data is not normally distributed, the Fisher
𝑍-transformation was applied to calculate population mean
and standard deviation, yielding the mean accuracy of 0.892
with standard deviation of 0.135.
The subject-wise confusionmatrix is presented in Figures
7 and 8. As the number of subjects is too high for meaningful
visualization, the confusion matrix was sorted according to
its diagonal value (correct hits), and the values for only 10
8 Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Ra
tio
 o
f s
ub
je
ct
s
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 10.4
Accuracy
Figure 6: Cumulative distribution plot of accuracy distribution in
subject classification.
0.45
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.02
0
0
0.11
0.02
0
0.55
0.02
0.02
0
0
0.02
0
0.02
0
0.05
0.03
0.63
0
0
0
0.06
0
0
0
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.74
0
0.03
0.02
0
0
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.75
0.02
0.02
0.02
0
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.05
0
0.75
0
0.06
0
0.02
0
0
0.15
0.02
0.02
0
0.78
0
0
0
0.02
0
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0
0.8
0
0
0.32
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.83
0
0
0
0.02
0
0.03
0
0
0.03
0
0.8336
6
29
27
41
14
42
37
21
15
21 37 42 14 41 27 29 6 3615
Figure 7: Subject-wise confusion matrix of classification results in
Scenario 1: 10 worst performing subjects.
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.98
22 18 16 13 12 3 2 35 32 24 1
22
18
16
13
12
3
2
35
32
24
1
Figure 8: Subject-wise confusion matrix of classification results in
Scenario 1: 10 best performing subjects.
True negatives
0.8952
False positives
0.0026
False negatives
0.1048
True positives
0.9974
Genuine userImpostor
Actual class
Predicted genuine user
Predicted impostor
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
cla
ss
Figure 9: Confusion matrix of classification results in Scenario 2.
FAR
FRR
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Er
ro
r r
at
e
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 4000
Threshold (bits)
Figure 10: FAR and FRR of the proposed EEG biometric system.
worst performing subjects (Figure 7) and 10 best performing
subjects (Figure 8) are shown.
For Scenario 2, the confusion matrix is presented in
Figure 9. We can see that True Positive Rate (TPR) is 0.9974.
We have evaluated the confusion matrix statistically using
the McNemar test. Critical value at 95% significance level is
3.8415. McNemar chi-square with Yates correction is 0.001,
while 𝑝 = 0.966. Therefore, the results are significant at alpha
= 0.05 level.
The values for FAR, FRR, and ERR are represented in
Figure 10.
The Area Under Curve (AUC) is calculated as the area
under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) [56]
curve and represents discrimination, that is, the ability of the
classifier to discriminate between a positive example and a
negative example.
We have achieved the following results, which are sum-
marized in Table 1.
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Table 1: Summary of classification results.
TAR FRR ERR AUC TPR
0.8952 0.026 0.024 0.9271 0.9974
Table 2: Comparison of the proposed method with the Fladby’s
method [27].
EER (proposed
method + our
dataset)
EER (Fladby method
+ Fladby dataset)
EER (Fladby method
+ our dataset)
0.024 0.2142
0.3059 (mean, all
channels)
0.2945 (Fp1)
0.2283 (best, P4)
Comparison. In Table 2 and Figure 11, we compare our results
with those of Fladby [27]. Note that Fladby used a simple EEG
reading device (NeuroskyThinkGear) with only one channel
of EEG data (Fp1), which may be affected by eye artefacts.
Sampling frequency was only 128Hz, and 20 seconds of
signal samples for each of eight different tasks was used for
authentication, which is unpractical for many applications.
Nevertheless, the method of Fladby [27], which employs
widely used power spectral features of EEG bands, can be
considered as a baseline, against which our method could
be compared. We have thoroughly replicated the conditions
of the experiment by Fladby on our dataset, using the same
number of samples (2560) for each snippet of subject EGG
data and a feature based distance metric to discriminate
between genuine and fraudulent authentication results, and
calculated the EER value. Note that our method uses all 20
EEG channels of the 10–20 international system, while Fladby
used only one EEG channel. Nevertheless, we have replicated
the calculations of the Fladby’s method on each EEG channel
tomake a fair comparison.The results are presented inTable 2
as well as in Figure 11. Fladby’s method achieved mean ERR
of 0.3059, while the Fp1 channel originally used by Fladby
achieved an ERR of 0.2945, and best ERR was achieved using
the P4 channel (0.2283). Note that we could not apply our
method on Fladby’s data, because it is not available.
Based on the presented comparison, we can claim that
the proposed method achieved better results for subject
authentication than the Fladby [27] method.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a secure cryptographic authentication
scheme for EEG-based biometrics based on the fuzzy com-
mitment scheme and the error-correcting Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hocquenghem (BCH) codes. The EEG features are derived
from the covariance matrix of EEG data from different EEG
channels in the 10–20 international system. The biometric
systemwas evaluated using the EEGdataset obtained from42
subjects. The experimental results show that the system can
generate up to 400 bits of cryptographic key from the EEG
codes, while tolerating up to 87 bits of error.The performance
of the biometric cryptosystem is an Equal Error Rate (EER)
Fladby
Proposed
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Figure 11: Comparison of EER of our method and Fladby’s method
[27] for each EEG channel.
of 0.024, True Positive Rate (TPR) of 0.9974, and Area Under
Curve (AUC) of 0.927.
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